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Brazil's International Development Cooperation: Old and New Motivations
ABSTRACT: Brazil has entered the world of development assistance provision, but with its own twist. This paper looks at what Brazil is doing in the provision of development assistance provision, arguing that despite protestations to the contrary, Brazil does provide ODA. The paper also argues that Brazil is taking a cross-government policy coherent approach to ODA, which includes recruitment of business interests. Turning to the motivations for providing foreign aid, the argument is that there is a genuine and deep concern with global poverty alleviation in Brazil, but that this does not preclude Brazilian policy makers from using aid and development-related activities from advancing the national interest. The added quirk that sets Brazil apart from Northern counterparts is that provision of development assistance offers significant benefits in terms of building internal international bureaucratic experience and helping national firms internationalize their market penetration and activities.
One of the quiet activities supporting Brazil's emergence as an important global player is its growing tendency to engage in substantive South-South technical cooperation activities. For Brazilian diplomats these activities represent cooperative ventures with other developing countries undertaken in partnerships that offer benefits for both parties. Framed in a policy context familiar to members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Brazil's accelerating South-South cooperation activities look a lot like the provision of official development assistance (ODA) because they do involve a direct transfer of resources from the Brazilian state to the partner government, although the transferred resources are not in the form of cash. This represents a quandary for many DAC-member development agencies because although Brazil is joining their game, it is not part of their club and not a donor signature to their ODA governance frameworks. Matters are further complicated when attention is turned to how Brazilian ODA is delivered, which differs markedly both in terms of project selection and delivery.
For many governments and research institutions understanding what Brazil is
doing in the field of development cooperation has become a priority, particularly when placed in the context of rising concern about the development assistancelike activities of China and increasingly India (Bräutigam, 2009; Chin and Quadir, 2013; Quadir, 2013; Rowlands, 2012; Saavedra, 2009 , Samy, 2010 Shaw, Cooper and Chin, 2009; Stuenkel, 2010; Woods 2008 (Cabral and Weinstock, 2010; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012; Inoue and Vaz, 2012; Milani and Carvalho, 2013; Pino, 2012; Pino and Leite, 2010; Stolte, 2012) . Significantly less attention has been given to a serious examination of why the Brazilian government has increased the pace of its ODA provision and how it meshes with broader foreign policy and trade policy priorities (White, 2013; Burges, 2013) .
On a theoretical level little attention has been given to what implications Brazilian motivations for providing development assistance might have for our understanding of why states, and in particular emerging power states, engage in development cooperation activities. As this paper will argue, the Brazilian case presents a twist on the established understandings of why ODA is provided, which may provide useful insight into foreign policy shifts in a number of emerging economies in the Americas and elsewhere. The foreign policy logic underpinning Brazilian development assistance provision does track closely with that found in DAC-member countries. Brazil's twist is an integration of development assistance provision into larger plans for long-term domestic development and the internationalization of national firms. Brazil's rhetoric of providing development assistance because it is the right thing to do is genuine, but does not trump national interest considerations. The shift in Brazil is an approach to national economic and social development that is predicated on an expanding and dynamic pan-Southern market. Finally, the Brazilian case offers some practical lessons about the efficient use of funds and existing capacities for policy-makers in DAC-member agencies seeking to maintain programming in an era of fiscal restraint.
The paper begins with a brief outline of the institutional structures and procedures governing Brazilian development assistance provision as well as an indication of the scale and nature of these activities. Attention is then turned to an examination of Brazilian motivations for giving foreign aid, using Hans Morgenthau's seminal essay 'A Political Theory of Foreign Aid' as a foil to guide the discussion. The paper concludes with a brief presentation of the implications that the Brazilian case holds for our understanding of why states provide foreign aid as well as lessons that aid bureaucrats might draw from an emerging power such as Brazil.
Research for this paper draws from a mixture of academic and policy papers, news reports, government documents and interviews with Brazilian government officials and international development and business officials in Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, New York, Washington, London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Maputo.
What is Brazil doing and how is it doing it?
The first point that must be clarified is one of terminology. Brazilian officials reject suggestions that they are providing official development assistance, preferring instead the term 'technical cooperation' and 'South-South technical cooperation'. Terms such as aid, development assistance, and ODA are rejected because of their implicit notions of hierarchical relations. The importance of this distinction is not altogether surprising if we consider the yawning income gaps in Brazil between the extremely rich and the deeply impoverished. Moreover, the explicit and implicit discourse surrounding development assistance provision brings with it suggestions of (neo)colonialism and (neo)imperialism that neither fit with Brazil's historical relations with other countries, nor match the official pattern of foreign relations being broadcast by the country's foreign ministry, Itamaraty. These definitional niceties aside, the technical cooperation discussed in this paper does fall well within the bounds of DAC (2008) definitions of official development assistance and as will be further elaborated below, the procedures surrounding Brazil's engagement with partner countries match important aspects of the development cooperation precepts espoused by the traditional donors. (IPEA, 2010: 21) . Officials in Itamaraty remarked during interviews in late 2012 that the ABC budget had experienced massive annual cuts during the first two years of the Dilma Rousseff presidency and that they were now having to refuse requests for technical cooperation assistance, particularly from the African countries that had been assiduously cultivated during the Lula presidency. The result is a quiet restraint on policy-setting autonomy at ABC and a careful retention of the Agency within the administrative bounds of the foreign ministry.
The associated churn in staff retards institutional memory and the Agency's capacity to develop an advanced policy planning capacity for its own activities and the sorts of country strategy frameworks found in DAC agencies.
The staffing, budgetary and policy restraints placed upon ABC are reflective of the manner in which the Brazilian government conducts its development cooperation activities. Brazil purports to be completely responsive with its development cooperation provision, addressing specific requests from partners rather than proposing activities. Moreover, the responsive nature of ABCcoordinated activities mean that ODA provision remains on an isolated project basis, not the larger program basis that DAC members use to align multiple projects towards a defined goal. Any sense that multiple Brazilian technical cooperation projects might be tied together is further diluted by how development cooperation is delivered. Rather than hiring outside consultants, the ABC mandate is to find agencies and departments within the Brazilian state that have the requested expertise and then coordinate the terms of reference for and delivery of a project. One of the objections expressed by officials in some DAC agencies is that this amounts to a form of tied aid because ABC does not tender its projects for public bidding. While there is definitely merit to this critique, and it is an issue being addressed by NGO groupings in Brazil such as Articulação Sul, there is a critical difference between the Brazilian government and its Northern counterparts.
In Brazil issues such as poverty reduction, microeconomic growth, education reform, public health expansion, and agrarian development are the central public policy problems preoccupying government, not questions for an often marginalized development agency struggling to maintain its budget and political position. Unlike the situation in Northern governments, the relevant and proven development expertise exists within the Brazilian state and its various agencies.
Where Northern development agencies focus on devising and proposing ideas that might work, the approach found through ABC is an attempt to translate policies and programs that have worked in Brazil to a different political, economic and cultural context. This is reflected in the attitude of countries seeking assistance through ABC. As El Savlador's vice minister of foreign affairs observed, 'Brazil's programs work and therefore offer valuable lessons for other developing countries' (Garcia, 2012) . While not satisfying the DAC rules on concessional financing and thus not eligible for consideration as ODA, BNDES financing nevertheless represents a significant savings for the recipient and sometimes allows the pursuit of infrastructure projects that would otherwise be impossible. For Lula the logic was quite simple, captured in his quip that 'Brazil cannot deport itself as a small country.' The BNDES responded with financing lines to reduce regional asymmetries and boost the physical integration links between Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay (Leo, 2007) . What Brazil did not entirely bargain for was potential blowback due to lacunae in planning and approval processes as well as commercial disputes between foreign governments and Brazilian contractors. For example, in 2011 serious indigenous protests erupted in Bolivia over attempts to build a BNDES-financed road through a remote border area (Murakawa, 2011) .
There were also disputes in Ecuador and Peru revolving around disagreements with contractors and planning process that enmeshed Brazilian-provided financing in internal and commercial disputes. While sometimes rowdy, there does seem to be a distinction between the financing and the actual source of the conflict. Indeed, one of the most problematic cases involving BNDES-financed infrastructure, the San Francisco dam project in Ecuador (Marcelino, 2008) , did not prevent president Rafael Correa willingly looking to Brazil for additional financing in 2012 (Marcelino, 2012) .
The second element is a process called competitive import substitution, which sees the Brazilian state encouraging a redirection of trade to bring comparable products in from other developing countries rather than from the North. An additional stream of this policy directly tackles the horrific conditions experienced by migrant Bolivian textile workers stuck in São Paulo sweatshops, encouraging production to be relocated to the neighbouring country. While both initiatives remain in the process of being fully implemented, each draws on some of the strategic political imperatives set out during the Cardoso presidency and further advanced during the Lula years through the idea of a new economic geography.
Established precedents for this program can be found in the decision in the late 1980s to reorient energy sourcing towards South America to belay the deleterious political impact of consistent regional trade surpluses. In its wider contemporary manifestation the idea is to draw on the Brazilian government's detailed line-item database of imports to act as matchmaker between firms in Brazil and potential alternate suppliers in countries such as Bolivia, Peru or Ecuador. (Chade, 2006; Saraiva, 2012; Dávila, 2010) , which can also include the use of Brazilian culture and ODA as fertilizer to create a fertile investment climate. Brazilian-led groupings such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking Nations (CPLP) have been used in this manner to set the stage for major investment actions such as Vale's US$6 billion Moatize coalmine expansion in
Mozambique and Petrobras oil investment in Guinea Bissau (Flak, 2011; Macauhub.com.mo, 2006) . More recently Brazilian construction companies have toured Lula through Africa and Latin America to help with access to upcoming infrastructure tenders (Carneiro de Mendonça, 2012; Scherer, 2012) .
The fourth element reinforces this, with Brazilian efforts to contribute to new international efforts such as the IBSA Fund for development through the UNDP (Vieira, 2013) , the Banco do Sul, and the mooted BRIC Bank alternative to the World Bank (Quadir, 2013 (Webber and Mander, 2011; Economic Times, 2012; Ranganathan, 2012 
Why Provide ODA?
The question that remains unanswered is why Brazil is now engaging in the provision of ODA and whether the rationale is any different than that of the existing donors. On one level the larger questions of why countries give foreign assistance are as applicable to the Brazilian case as to members of the DAC. Ruttan (1989) echoes and condenses Mason's (1964) earlier work by categorizing the various motivations for ODA provision into two broad sets of arguments:
those based on the economic and security self-interests of the donor country; and those based on the moral and ethical responsibility of the donor country. As will be set out, both apply to the Brazilian case, with Lula administration officials going so far as to build elements of their country's foreign policy and international identity around a responsibility to ensure that the rest of the global South progresses with Brazil, albeit as much for market growth reasons as genuine concerns with human development. The blending of these two motivations, which Ruttan acknowledges, points to an additional element of foreign aid as an attractive policy tool, which is that it is relatively benign and flexible, relying heavily on public relations as well as the strengthening of diplomatic relations (Grant and Nijman, 1998) . For Brazil this is particularly attractive and fits with its self-image of a non-interventionist country dedicated to finding positive outcomes to international challenges. An added attraction is the high symbolic importance that a relatively small commitment can have for decision-makers in the recipient country.
In order to give a more detailed explanation of why a state might give foreign aid, Black (1968) sets out four broad policy categories. The first three correspond directly to the interest-driven aspects of foreign policy by focusing on defense, economic and political reasons. Arguably, his fourth rationale -humanitarianism -overarches these three if we turn our attention to the impact that mass tragedy can have on regional political economies. As a classificatory system these four criteria allow us to make quick attributions of why ODA is given, but they do not provide much avenue for explaining the activity in more detail. To do this it is more useful to turn to Morgenthau's 1962 article 'A Political Theory of Foreign Aid', where he sets out six types of foreign aid:
1) Humanitarian foreign aid -an ostensibly non-political form of aid that is designed to provide immediate relief to a country finding itself in a state of crisis that threatens immediate and widespread tragedy for the population. The goal is to prevent the breakdown of order and the rise of situations resembling a failed state.
2) Subsistence foreign aid -foreign aid extended to governments that do not possess the resources necessary to maintain a minimal level of public services. Again, the ambition is to ensure that societal order does not breakdown and lead to a failed state. Unlike humanitarian aid, which can be blind to the regime in power in a given country, subsistence foreign aid has an explicit element of maintaining the status quo. the areas where ABC has been most active, with 22% of assistance going to agricultural programming, 16.6% to health projects, 12.6% to education, 11.8% to public administration and security and 7.5% to environmental issues (Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: 6) . To advance projects in these policy areas ABC draws on the The challenge facing Brazilian firms professing a long view is that the human capital and domestic supply chains that they need may not exist (Peres, 2013) .
While it is a stretch to suggest that Brazilian ODA is directly driven by companies such as Vale or Odebrecht, the technical assistance coordinated by ABC helps create the conditions they need to pursue their in-country strategy. One example is Embrapa's ProSavana program Mozambique. Beginning with the observation that the climate and soil in Mozambique are similar to Brazil, Embrapa has been exploring how integrated agro-industrial systems might be set up. For Odebrecht this represents an opportunity to diversify activities beyond civil engineering.
Vale has taken an interest in the project as a parallel development hub around its Moatize mine, looking to ProSavana as avenue for the locally-sourcing food supplies and expanding its long-term development impact on region.
While not designed to be exclusive to Brazilian investors -ProSavana is a trilateral project with Japan -the underlying reality is that the initiative is pursued and presented in Portuguese. The importance of language as a source of relational power should not be underestimated for the Brazilian-interest advancing aspects of ODA activities in Lusophone Africa. As Mozambique's minister for natural resources observed: 'Brazil has an advantage by speaking Portuguese, but its firms face the same conditions as any other company' (Bias, 2013) . This filters through into other areas of ODA-like activities that support Brazilian firms.
Capacity building, particularly the provision of advanced professional and technical training in Brazil is held up by Mozambique's foreign minister as an important contributor to development human capital development (Baloi, 2013) . Where the BNDES financing becomes significant id for state-driven infrastructure projects. Here the firm works closely with the tendering government to complete the finance application for a BNDES project loan. A construction bonanza is restrained by the commercial status that these loans are given by the IMF and World Bank, and thus subject to commercial debt limits under IFI conditionalities.
But when a bid is arranged, ODA and the legacy of Lula's turn to the South is used to gain access and close deals (Carneiro de Mendonça, 2012; Scherer, 2012 (Carvalho, 2012) .
The Brazil End -What has changed?
Brazil's different domestic context for the provision of development assistance suggest that there could be a number of factors at play in the decision to provide South-South technical cooperation that are not captured by the current thinking on why states give aid. On a foreign policy level the very factors that prompt many DAC members to give aid as a moral responsibility are working on Brazil to draw it into the game as a sign it belongs at the top global governance tables. This involves a twist on the 'prestige' rationale set out by Morgenthau, with Brazil providing foreign aid as a sign that it is no longer a developing country, but an emerging power (Muggah and Hamann, 2012: 4) . There is also a conscious desire to build soft power by showing the world how successful Brazil has been at combating poverty and export these programs to the rest of the world as an example to be followed. This is particularly the case with Brazilian social programs beyond the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Familia, including other initiatives such as the National Food Acquisition Program (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos) and the National School Meals Program (Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar) (Itamaraty, n.d.) .
Ambitions to export Brazilian approaches to public policy problems bears an uncomfortable similarity to the sorts of expansionist and dependence-creating logic that helped support the rise of ODA programming in many DAC-member countries. The difference in Brazil is that combatting poverty is the prime public policy problem, not an activity pursued because it also offers important collateral Searchers were at the one digit harmonized code level, with chapters 6-9 being aggregated to form the value added exports number and chapter 1 used for agricultural exports. [http://www.iadb.org/es/intal/estadisticas-decomercio,7585.html] not require direct involvement or even participation from the foreign ministry (Daudelin, 2005) . This becomes even more the case as international bureaucratic interactions move into increasingly technical discussions that become very specific to a discrete policy area with little clear impact beyond the acting ministry, i.e., phytosanitary standards and monitoring in the export of frozen chicken pieces. In the Brazilian context this presents a bit of a challenge for many ministries because the inward concentration of the state means that most lack a cadre of officials and technocrats with cross-cultural or international experience.
The Brazilian approach to ODA of sending state-agency experts overseas to engage in the direct provision of technical assistance helps build the pool of international experience. This in turn is expanding the policy areas and actors actively involved in foreign policy outside of the oversight of the foreign ministry (Pinheiro and Milani, 2012) .
The provision of ODA thus offers Brazil an opportunity to develop its international capacity through a process of learning by doing. As was the case with Mercosur and the internationalization of Brazilian business, ABCcoordinated activities act as a sort of incubator that allows a measured insertion into international contexts in an environment where the stakes are not massive and the general attitude positive because it is directed towards mutual development.
This aspect of mutual learning is doubly important because the expansion of experience gained by attempting to transfer elements of the Brazilian programs abroad offers a valuable critical evaluation loop, requiring a questioning of how things are done as they are moved to another developing society context.
Conclusions
Although a genuine desire to contribute to global development does underpin Brazilian development assistance provision, it is far from a completely altruistic activity and thus free of Morgenthau's idea of 'aid as bribery'. The difference between Brazilian and DAC-member ODA is that Brazil 'buys' support more through the expression of solidarity and transfer of applied expertise than the provision or promise of substantive economic rents, which then opens space for new economic and political opportunities. In this respect Brazil has neatly avoided the trap of becoming over-committed or subject to exploitation for retained political support. Not only is the scale of the aid too small to make such manipulation worthwhile, the concentration on technical assistance in lieu of cash grants removes some of the space for aid-dependency. Indeed, the absence of direct cash transfers means that the technical assistance provided by Brazil remains remarkably free of the corruption problems that require significant oversight expenditure in OECD-DAC agencies. This reflects a real sense of partnership in the Brazilian development model, which is increasingly explicit that continued social and economic progress in Brazil will not be possible if suggests that while the rhetoric, form, and delivery of Brazilian ODA bears considerable differences from that of DAC-member states, the underlying motivations are still remarkably similar.
